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THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING 
PREVENTION ACT: HOW CAN 
NON-MARITAL CHILDREN BE 
PROTECTED? 
Nancy S. Erickson* 
Parental kidnapping has been called "one of the most subtle 
and brutal forms of child abuse."1 The National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in its Prefatory Note to 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), stated: 
The harm done to children by these experiences 
can hardly be overestimated. It does not require 
an expert in the behavioral sciences to know that 
a child, especially during his early years and the 
years of growth, needs security and stability of 
environment and a continuity of affection. A child 
who has never been given the chance to develop a 
sense of belonging and whose personal attach-
ments when beginning to form are cruelly dis-
rupted, may well be crippled for life, to his own 
lasting detriment and the detriment of society.z 
In response to the seriousness of the problem of child-
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1. Note, Prevention of Child Stealing: The Need for a National Policy, 11 Loy. 
L.A.L. REV. 829, 831 (1978). 
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snatching and its increasing incidence in this country, steps have 
been taken on both state and federal levels. The UCCJA was 
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and by the American Bar Association in 1968.3 
By 1984 it had been enacted in all states and the Virgin Islands.· 
Virtually all states have also enacted criminal parental kidnap-
ping statutes. II In 1980, Congress passed the Parental Kidnap-
ping Prevention Act (PKPA), which not only strengthened the 
provisions of state laws but also contained additional safeguards 
against childsnatching.6 
Before the UCCJA and the PKPA, a parent who lost a cus-
tody battle could simply snatch the child, take the child to an-
other state, and seek a court order of custody in that state. Us-
ing the child's presence in the state as a basis for jurisdiction, 
the second state could and often would entertain the petition for 
custody. Then the court of the second state would often ignore 
the custody order of the first state on the ground that states 
were not required under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to give 
recognition to custody orders of other states.7 The UCCJA was 
designed to prevent states from giving refuge to childsnatchers 
by requiring them to decline jurisdiction of custody actions if 
another state (usually the state from which the child was 
snatched) was a more appropriate forum.s The PKPA was 
designed to achieve the same goal by requiring states to give full 
faith and credit to existing custody decrees if those decrees ful-
filled certain specifications in the PKP A. Additionally, the 
PKP A authorizes the Federal Parent Locator Service to assist in 
locating abducted children and their abductors and provides 
that the Fugitive Felony Act applies to state felony parental kid-
3. Id. at 111. 
4. Id. at 1986; Supplementary Pamphlet at 25-26. 
5. See P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK, & J. O'DANIEL, INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY 
DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLICY, PRACTICE AND LAW, Appendix IV (1982) 
[hereinafter Interstate Disputes]. 
6. Public Law 96-611, § § 6-10, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. 1982), note to 
18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976), and 42 U.S.C. § 651 (Supp. 1982). It should be noted that the 
federal law criminalizing interstate kidnapping is ineffective against parental kidnapping 
because it provides for parental immunity for kidnapping one's own minor child. 18 
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1984). 
7. Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493 (1981); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. 
Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Halvey v. Halvey, 
330 U.S. 610 (1947). 
8. For more detail, see Interstate Disputes, supra note 5, at 1-4 to 1-6. 
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napping cases where the abductor has left the state or the coun-
try to avoid prosecution.' 
The UCCJA and the PKPA have been quite effective in 
achieving their child-protective goals with regard to children of 
divorced couples, but they are much less protective of children 
of parents who have never been married. The PKPA, in particu-
lar, contains loopholes so large as to make much of it virtually 
useless in many cases concerning non-marital children. 
As an illustration of these loopholes, let us consider the hy-
pothetical case of Jennifer Ross, whose mother is Paula Grubs, 
and whose father is Clyde Ross.tO 
Paula and Clyde lived together for about a year in New 
York State. During that time, Jennifer was born. Six months af-
ter the birth, Clyde departed and thereafter communicated with 
Paula only sporadically; she thought he was living near his par-
ents in New Jersey. Clyde provided no child support. On her 
own, Paula was unable to pay for child care, so she had to leave 
her job and apply for public assistance. The welfare authorities 
required that she cooperate in an action against Clyde for pater-
nity and child support; she cooperated, and an order of pater-
nity, along with a child support order, was issued against him. 
However, Paula still did not receive any child support from 
Clyde. . 
When Jennifer was two years old, Clyde phoned to ask 
whether he could take Jennifer to New Jersey to visit his par-
ents. He indicated that he would pick Jennifer up on Saturday 
morning and return her on Sunday afternoon. He stated that he 
had just obtained a good job and would soon be sending money 
to enable Paula to get off welfare. Paula agreed to the visit and 
released the child to him on Saturday morning. When Clyde did 
not return on Sunday, Paula phoned his parents, only to be told 
that he had not brought Jennifer to visit them and that they did 
not know where he was living, but they thought it was Washing-
9. See Interstate Disputes, supra note 5, at 1-6 to 1-10. 
10. The names were taken from the case of Grubs v. Ross, 291 Or. 263, 630 P.2d 353 
(1981), which had a happier ending than this hypothetical. The hypothetical also has 
some factual similarities to the case of Albergottie v. James, 470 A.2d 266 (D.C. App. 
1983). 
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ton, D.C .. 
Paula went to the police to swear out a warrant for his ar-
rest on a kidnapping charge. However, the police asked to see 
her custody order, and she could not produce one. Since she and 
Clyde had never been married, they were never divorced, and no 
custody order was ever issued. The court orders establishing pa-
ternity and child support contained no custody provisions.11 The 
police informed Paula that since she had no custody order, 
Clyde could not be guilty of any crime, misdemeanor or other-
wise, for taking Jennifer through his ruse and hiding her from 
Paula. Ii Because no felony could be charged, the state prosecu-
tor's office could not apply to the United States Attorney for a 
"UFAP" (Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution) warrant and re-
quest F.B.1. assistance in locating the child, pursuant to the 
PKPA.Is 
11. It may seem incomprehensible that a court order could require, for example, 
that a father pay $40 per week to a mother for the support of their child without also 
making an order that the mother should have custody of the child. If the mother does 
not have custody of the child, why should she be receiving child support for the child? 
Putting aside the issue of whether the court hearing a paternity case involving the issue 
of support would have jurisdiction to determine custody (see Interstate Disputes, supra 
note 5, at 2-15 to 2-17), there are many cases where the mother has de facto custody, 
which has been uncontested by the father, and either she is not a party to the paternity 
proceeding (the Welfare Department being the petitioner in her stead) or her attorney 
sees no need to seek a formal custody order. Id. at 2-16. 
This is unfortunate, since the issue should be decided early on in order to avoid 
disruption to the child's life later. If the issue is left open, the father can always seek 
custody later, and if custody were granted to him, the change might well be more trau-
matic to the child than it would have been earlier. The usual standard used by the court 
to make an initial order of custody is the "best interests of the child". Once an initial 
order is in place, if the non-custodial parent wishes custody, he or she must petition for a 
change of custody. The usual standard for a change of custody is whether there has been 
a substantial change of circumstances so that the best interests of the child require a 
change of custody. Thus, the non-custodial parent in a change of custody proceeding 
faces a heavier burden of proof than either parent in an initial custody proceeding. That 
higher burden of proof is intended to protect the child against moves that will under-
mine the child's sense of stability and continuity. See infra text accompanying notes 18-
20. 
12. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.50 (McKinney 1987) makes "Custodial Interference in the 
First Degree" a felony. However, since Paula had no custody order, Clyde could not be 
guilty of interfering with her lawful custody. The same is true with respect to "Custodial 
Interference in the Second Degree," a misdemeanor. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.45 (McKin-
ney 1987). Clyde could be charged with the misdemeanor of "Unlawful Imprisonment" 
but he would have an affirmative defense to such a charge because he was the child's 
"relative". N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.15 (McKinney 1987). 
13. The PKPA provides that the Fugitive Felon Act (18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976» shall 
apply in state felony parental childsnatching cases if the abductor crosses state lines or 
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Next, Paula went to a private attorney. Fortunately, her 
parents agreed to pay the attorney's fees. Even if she had been 
entitled to a court-appointed lawyer, such attorneys often han-
dle too many cases to be able to devote much time to anyone 
case, especially on an emergency basis. The private attorney ad-
vised Paula that the first step was to locate Jennifer. To do this, 
she commenced a custody action under the UCCJA and peti-
tioned the court to request the Federal Parent Locator Service 
(FPLS) to locate Jennifer and Clyde. Fortunately, Paula had 
Clyde's social security number, because the FPLS relies primar-
ily on computer searches of various data sources for the target 
parent's social security number.u While the FPLS search was 
proceeding, the court served notice on Clyde by mail to his last-
known address, to his parents' address, and publication in a 
newspaper in Washington, D.C., the cost of which Paula had to 
pay. Clyde failed to appear for the custody hearing, and the 
court granted Paula a temporary order of custody. However, by 
this time Clyde's trail was cold, and Paula was never able to lo-
cate him, despite the FPLS search and her own efforts. 111 Her 
custody order proved worthless. 
This hypothetical case points out the need for immediate 
and effective assistance to locate abducted children. The PKPA 
was intended to provide such assistance by authorizing F.B.I. in-
vestigations of child abductions. However, because a court order 
of custody is a prerequisite to F.B.I. involvement, most non-
marital children are unprotected by this PKP A provision. IS In 
the extensive literature on parental kidnapping and the PKP A, 
there is virtually no notice of this problem. 17 
leaves the United States to avoid prosecution. Public Law 96-611 § 10, 94 Stat. 3573 
(Dec. 28, 1980). For a discussion of how this statute operates, see Interstate Disputes, 
supra note 5, at 8-24 to 8-26. 
14. For a description of the operation of FPLS, see Interstate Disputes, supra note 
5, at 13-1 to 13-3. 
15. See id. at 13-8 to 13-9 for steps parents can take to locate their abducted 
children. 
16. Marital children are also unprotected if snatched before any court order is made 
regarding custody; commonly this occurs just as the marriage is breaking up. However, 
many divorcing parents, having been advised by counsel, realize the need for a custody 
order and request a temporary custody order at the same time a divorce action is com-
menced. Single mothers, on the other hand, often are not aware of the importance of a 
custody order - they believe they already have legal custody, since they have physical 
custody and were never married to the father. 
17. See M. AGOPIAN, MICHAEL, PARENTAL CHILD STEALING (Lexington Books, 1981); 
5
Erickson: Kidnapping Prevention Act
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988
534 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:529 
Furthermore, even if Paula had been able to locate Clyde, 
her lack of a pre-abduction custody order would mean that, in 
most states, she and Clyde would stand on an equal footing with 
regard to custody. Paula's sole physical custody of Jennifer up 
until the abduction and the failure of Clyde to pay child support 
would not be enough to guarantee that Paula would be awarded 
custody.I8 To gain legal custody, Paula would have to prove that 
an award of custody to her would be in the "best interest of the 
child".19 By contrast, if Paula had had a pre-abduction custody 
order, the burden would be on Clyde to prove that "changed cir-
Barker, Edward & Hamman, The Best Interests of the Child in Custody Controversies 
Between Natural Parents: Interpretations and Trends, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 482 (1975); 
Batt, Child Custody Disputes: A Development Psychological Approach to Proof and 
Decision Making, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 491 (1975); Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: In-
titial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203 
(1981); Bodenheimer, Progress Under the UCCJA and Remaining Problems: Punitive 
Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 CAL. L. REV. 978 (1977); 
Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis In and Out of State, 46 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 495 (1975); Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legisla-
tive Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1969); 
Cleveland, The UCCJA and the PKPA: Dual Response to Interstate Child Custody 
Problems, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149 (1982); Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Juris-
diction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711 (1982); R. CROUCH, INTER-
STATE CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE To USE AND COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE UCCJA 
(1981); P. HOFF, INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CHILD-CUSTODY DISPUTES: A COLLECTION 
OF MATERIALS (3d ed. 1982); P. Hoff, Use of the Federal Parental Kidnapping Law, 15 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 138 (1981); P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK, & J. O'DANIEL. IN-
TERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLICY, PRACTICE AND 
LAW (1982); Hudak, The Plight of the Interstate Child in American Courts, 9 AKRON L. 
REV. 257 (1975); Irani, Parental Kidnapping: Can the UCCJA and Federal PKPA of 
1980 Effectively Deter It?, 20 DUQ. L. REV. 43 (1981); S. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING: THE 
LEGAL RESPONSE To THE ABDUCTION OF CHILDREN (1981); Mothershead, The Problem of 
Parental Kidnapping, 10 WYo. L.J. 225 (1965); Noelker, The UCCJA: The Difficulties It 
Presents for Poor People, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 222 (1977); Ratner, Child Custody in 
a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 795 (1964); Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the 
Interstate Child Custody Problem: A Reply to Professor Currie and a Proposed Uni-
form Act, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1965); Ratner, Procedural Due Process and Jurisdic-
tion to Adjudicate, 75 N.w.U. L. REV. 363 (1980); Stern, Stemming the Proliferation of 
Parental Kidnapping: New York's Adoption of the UCCJA, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 89 
(1978); Note, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Analysis and Impact on the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 553 (1981); Note, Pre-
vention of Child Stealing: Need for a National Policy, 11 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 829 (1978). 
18. See, e.g., In re Weinstein, 42 Ill. Dec. 243, 87 Ill. App. 3d 101, 408 N.E.2d 952 
(1980) (father kidnapped child, but court awarded him custody because, inter alia, no 
court order existed at time of kidnapping); Albergottie v. James, 470 A.2d 266 (D.C. App. 
1983) (similar to Weinstein). 
19. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 724 P.2d 486, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1986) (best 
interests test, not changed circumstances test, applies where there has never been a court 
order of custody regarding the non-marital child, even though child has been living with 
his mother for his entire life). 
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cumstances" following the original custody order warranted a 
change of custody; this would be more difficult to prove, so 
Paula's custody would probably remain secure.20 The reason for 
the higher burden of proof for a change of custody is that stabil-
ity and continuity of relationships are deemed important for 
children. 
A few states have laws, several only recently enacted, that 
may afford non-marital children some measure of protection in 
abduction situations. For example, a few states provide that, by 
operation of law, a mother has legal custody of her non-marital 
child unless and until the child is legitimated or a different cus-
tody order is made by a court.2l In cases involving the PKP A, 
such legal custody might be viewed as equivalent to the requisite 
court order of custody. At least one other state, in its criminal 
child abduction statute, provides that an unmarried mother is 
presumed to be the lawful custodian of her non-marital child 
and that an unadjudicated putative father commits child abduc-
tion if he "conceals, detains, or removes the child without the 
consent of the mother". 22 
The statutes discussed in the paragraph above suggest one 
possible option for reform of other states' laws. Each state could 
pass statutes providing that the mother automatically has cus-
tody of a non-marital child upon the child's birth, unless and 
20. See discussion of the changed circumstances rule in Burchard, 724 P.2d at 488-
91. In that case, the trial court and the intermediate appellate court, applying the best 
interests test, transferred custody from the unmarried mother who had raised the child 
for the two and one half years of his life to the unmarried father, giving little weight to 
the child's need for stability and continuity. The California Supreme Court, holding that 
the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to give weight to that factor, reversed 
the lower court order, and sent the case back for a new trial. Unfortunately, the child 
had been with the father for over four years while the appeals were pending, so even if 
the initial transfer of custody to the father was in error (which was not decided by the 
California Supreme Court), to correct the error by transferring custody back to the 
mother would cause a second uprooting of the child. 
21. See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 675.40 (West 1987); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.541(1) (West Supp. 1986). 
22. 38 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 10-5, 10-6 (Supp. 1987) (Amendment to the Intergovern-
mental Missing Children Recovery Act of 1984). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (Deer-
ings Supp. 1988), which, as a matter of law, gives sole legal custody to an unmarried 
mother at birth when there is no presumed father. Thereafter, if the father abducts the 
child, he may be prosecuted for child abduction under Section 278 of the Penal Code 
even though there is no custody decree. Section 278 was upheld against an equal protec-
tion attack by an unwed father in People v. Carrillo, 162 Cal. App. 3d 585, 208 Cal. Rptr. 
684 (1984). 
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until a court order provides otherwise. To guarantee court recog-
nition of her custody, the state could routinely provide each 
such mother with a custody order as soon after the birth as prac-
ticable. In addition, or as a second option, the PKP A could be 
amended to provide that, in lieu of a custody order, the authori-
ties could accept a sworn statement by the mother that (1) she is 
the child's mother, as evidenced by the birth certificate, (2) she 
was not and is not married to the child's father, (3) she has had 
physical custody of the child, and (4) the child has disappeared 
or has been taken from her. 
There are two practical difficulties with the second ap-
proach. First, a birth certificate does not generally indicate 
whether the child's parents are married. Thus, if a birth certifi-
cate for Susan Smith states that her parents are Mary Smith 
and John Jones, there is no way to determine from the certifi-
cate whether the parents are married and gave their daughter 
the mother's surname or whether the parents are not married.23 
Second, the parents might have married after the child's birth, 
thus "legitimating" the child under most state laws.24 These dif-
ficulties could be overcome if authorities accepted the prima fa-
cie validity of the mother's statements until the child was lo-
cated. A hearing could then be held with both parents present. 
The first option might be preferable because it would have a 
beneficial side-effect. If a custody order were routinely issued to 
the mother upon the birth of a non-marital child, the law could 
give the mother and father the option of obtaining instead a 
court order of paternity with whatever custody provisions the 
parents agreed to. This could be done if both parents agreed 
that the father should be declared the legal father and both 
signed a joint declaration of paternity. 
This procedure would differ from current practice in most 
states in one important way. Currently, when a non-marital 
child is born the parents generally have the opportunity to file a 
joint declaration of paternity with the Registrar of Vital Statis-
23. See MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their Children, 3 LAW & IN-
EQUALITY 93 (1985). For an example of the many state laws that specify that the fact of 
in-wedlock or out-of-wedlock birth shall not appear on the birth certificate, see N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 4135(1)(a) (McKinney 1988). 
24. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24 (McKinney 1988). 
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tics so that the father's name will appear on the birth certifi-
cate. 211 However, in order to convert a declaration of paternity 
into a court order of paternity, the mother, father, or both par-
ents must commence a paternity action in the appropriate court. 
Often this is not done because the parties have insufficient funds 
to hire a private lawyer, and appointed counsel is not available 
to them. If a joint declaration of paternity could be converted 
into a paternity order by means of an automatic and simplified 
court procedure that was handled by an attorney employed by 
the court or a non-profit organization, that procedure might ob-
viate the need for many of the more formal and adversary pater-
nity actions that now clog our family courts.26 
Research should be conducted to determine which of these 
options, or perhaps another option, would most effectively pro-
tect non-marital children against kidnappings by their non-cus-
todial parents. 
In the rush to pass laws to prevent and punish child-snatch-
ing, the non-marital child has been overlooked. The loopholes in 
the UCCJA and the PKPA need to be eliminated so that non-
marital children will not once again become stigmatized, second-
class citizens, who are denied equal protection under the law, as 
they were in our not-too-distant past.27 
25. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4135(2) (McKinney 1988). 
26. I believe this procedure would reduce the number of adversary paternity actions 
because the parents are often psychologically closer at the time of the child's birth than 
they are a few years later, when the Welfare Department or the mother or someone else 
on the child's behalf finally brings a paternity action. The procedure has the disadvan-
tage, however, of being brought during a period of time when the mother may be most 
naive about the possible conflicts of interest that may arise between her and the father 
concerning raising of the child. Thus, both parties would need to receive the advice of 
counsel to make sure that they understand the consequences of the joint declaration and 
the court order that would be issued based on the joint declaration. 
27. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 
409 U.S. 535 (1973); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982). 
9
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